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International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles. By Mark
Gibney. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008. Pp. xi,
149. Price: $24.95 (Paperback). Reviewed by Tasha Manoranjan.
In International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles,
Mark Gibney attempts to provide a new framework for actualizing human
rights around the globe. Gibney describes an "easy" four-step process that he
claims would substantially enhance global protection of human rights:
responsibility, territory, accountability, and remedy (p. 13). This process is
meant to establish degrees of responsibility for human rights violations,
transform the notion of territory to hold states accountable for their human
rights obligations within and beyond their own borders, and provide a remedy
for victims when states violate human rights.
Gibney argues that states are currently able to hide behind the principle
of sovereignty, and the immunity it provides, to avoid responsibility for
human rights violations within their borders and, indirectly, through arming
and enabling rogue regimes. He argues that his four-step process will
revolutionize thinking and acting on behalf of human rights, by introducing
accountability into the international system. Gibney attempts to reconcile
sovereign immunity with existing legal obligations states have agreed to
uphold, by arguing that states have willingly ceded some sovereignty in
becoming parties to international treaties. This enables other states to enforce
treaties against violating states.
Gibney's objective is noble, and sorely needed. His book adds
worthwhile support to the debate surrounding impunity for human rights
violations and identifies valuable mechanisms for bridging the alarming
disconnect between international law and international practice. Gibney's
writing style is also highly palatable. The book is accessible and efficient: he
wastes no time with flowery language and succinctly conveys his points. His
straightforward approach to human rights protection would have been greatly
furthered, however, by a more pragmatic framework for enforcing human
rights around the world.
Gibney identifies the end we want to achieve-an international norm of
accountability for human rights violations-but does not provide a roadmap to
actualize this ideal. The book is often backward-looking and theoretical.
Gibney focuses his examination on legal precedent that has diminished human
rights protection and allowed states to violate international law. The crux of
the book explains the problem of enforcing human rights around the world:
the ability of states to hide behind sovereign immunity.
Unfortunately, readers looking for solutions to the shortcomings of the
current status quo will likely be disappointed. Only in the last thirty pages
does Gibney attempt to offer concrete mechanisms for improving human
rights protections around the globe. His book hastily addresses what is
arguably the most important aspect of international human rights:
enforcement.
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Gibney emphasizes the current legal obligations that states possess
through treaties, conventions, and jus cogens (p. 130). He argues that current
legal obligations are adequate on paper, but that states' actions often fail to
reflect this: "As empirical data has shown, being a party to [the Torture
Convention] (or any other) international human rights treaty has essentially no
bearing on actual state practice" (p. 101). Gibney identifies and constructs
several new proposals for holding states accountable for human rights
violations, which he argues will end the cycle of impunity and thereby prevent
or strictly circumscribe future violations.
Gibney first proposes the creation of an International Civil Court, which
would enable individuals to bring evidence and charges against states for
human rights violations. He argues that the International Criminal Court does
not empower individuals to bring charges against their abusers. The
prosecutorial office has discretion in taking cases, and the court's jurisdiction
is limited to only four human rights areas: genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and the crime of aggression (p. 121).
Gibney presents a second proposal from Manfred Nowak, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, for a World Court within the United
Nations that would hold states accountable under international human rights
treaties. However, Nowak's proposal is inadequate for Gibney's purposes. It
allows states to choose which treaties would be binding under the World
Court and focuses on states' direct human rights violations while ignoring
indirect violations such as providing arms to regimes that abuse human rights.
Gibney's third proposal is potentially the most controversial and potent:
to use domestic courts in third-party states to hold other states accountable for
human rights violations. Legal vehicles do already exist in several countries
for holding individual citizens of other countries accountable-for example,
the Alien Tort Statute in the United States and provisions of the State
Immunity Act in the United Kingdom-but these vehicles do not allow one
state to find the other state itself guilty of these violations. He argues that the
domestic courts of countries party to relevant international treaties should
exercise jurisdiction over other states (p. 139).
Without historical or statutory precedent for such action, it can be
difficult for a court to assert jurisdiction in this manner. Gibney rightfully
points to the Alien Tort Statute, which allows human rights claims against
individual abusers, as precedent for such action. He eloquently justifies
extending the Alien Tort Statute to hold states equally accountable.
There are at least two objections to Gibney's third proposal. Allowing
one state to be tried in the courts of another goes against basic principles of
state sovereignty: the state being tried has not consented to the trial and thus
should not be bound by the result. Moreover, some states perceive concerns
over human rights as merely promoting the neo-imperialist agenda of the
West. Holding states accountable in the domestic courts of other states would
engender further concern along these lines, unless and until Western states
were held equally accountable for human rights violations in other countries'
courts.
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The book offers a rousing call to action but is ultimately impractical.
Gibney lacks a methodology for implementing the book's strategy. He
correctly identifies jurisdiction as one obstacle to holding a state accountable
in another country's domestic courts and addresses this by saying America
should be able to enforce the treaties it is party to against other countries that
violate them.
Here, Gibney's analysis is flawed: when legal structures and
jurisprudence all promote human rights in theory, how do you muster the
political will to enforce human rights in actuality? For example, Congress
passed the Genocide Accountability Act in 2007, 1 which provides the
statutory basis for holding Sri Lankan officials with U.S. citizenship or Green
Cards responsible for killing tens of thousands of Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka.
However, despite a meticulous model indictment of over eight hundred pages
that was delivered to the Department of Justice in February 2009, the
Department has yet to initiate an investigation. Readers will be disappointed
to find that Gibney does not offer any solution to the crucial question of
enforcement. Gibney fails to provide any insight into persuading the Justice
Department or any court to press charges against foreign officials-the most
crucial step in providing a real remedy to victims.
Gibney skillfully weaves his theory together with relevant legal
precedent to poignantly demonstrate the flaws of the current human rights
enforcement system. He draws from cases across international tribunals,
regional human rights courts, and domestic courts to depict current and ideal
protections for universal human rights principles. These examples are
intriguing and constitute the core of the book. They demonstrate how courts
have had the opportunity to adjudicate international human rights principles,
but cowardly chose to hide behind the shield of sovereignty instead.
Gibney's book is hopeful for a system that respects human rights and
holds states accountable for violations of international human rights law.
Gibney argues that new mechanisms theoretically could improve enforcement
of human rights violations, and thus his book is a worthy contribution to the
field. However, it could have been richer had he included a more realistic
strategy to bridge the divide between international principle and practice.
Just Trade. By Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol & Stephen J. Powell. New York:
NYU Press, 2009. Pp. 390. Price: $55.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Paul Slattery.
In Just Trade, Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol and Stephen J. Powell argue
that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights inaugurated a persistent divide
between international trade law and international human rights law. At best,
they claim, this divide ignores the unparalleled power of trade to advance
human rights. At worst, it spawns preventable human rights crises. The
authors call on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its member states to
1. Genocide Accountability Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2006).
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use trade policies to advance and enforce international human rights law. They
argue that trade law and human rights law share synergies, and the book
explores how extant trade frameworks recognize, ignore, or counteract these
synergies.
Just Trade names two intended audiences: students in a trade and human
rights course and professionals in all fields. As a textbook, it has much to
offer. It provides an accessible introduction to international law, human rights
law, and trade law. It also surveys pressing concerns with global trade and
provides ample material for classroom discussion. For a professional
audience, the book persuasively links evolving trade agreements, rules, and
jurisprudence to the frustrations and potential outlets for human rights
advocates. Its exploration of evolving WTO jurisprudence frames the issues
with particular clarity.
The prescriptive project of Just Trade is less lucid. Terms like
globalization, nation-state, and human rights all lack clear, consistent
definitions. Some policy proposals are noncommittal and others have
unaddressed and potentially daunting ramifications. In all, the book is
thought-provoking and descriptively compelling, but its recommendations
leave readers wondering.
The core of Just Trade is the authors' proposed relationship between
human rights law and trade law. "[H]uman rights norms are indisputably the
foundational, widely shared standards of justice and right conduct," are
inextricably linked to trade policies, and "should prevail over trade norms" (p.
67). The WTO and member states are obligated to enforce these human rights
norms through trade rules and agreements, and their obligations extend
beyond each country's citizens and borders. Developed countries, in
particular, have "perpetuat[ed] a global order whose foreseeable effects are
widespread human rights harms" and "have a negative duty to ameliorate the
human rights harm that their global institutional order has caused" (p. 288).
This proposed duty motivates the authors' straightforward though
noncommittal, analysis of many human rights issues. For example, the authors
describe the disparate impact of global trade on women. They recommend
giving women more say in trade policy and consider the gendered impact of
new trade agreements (p. 204). Similarly, the authors argue that global trade
fosters trafficking in forced labor. They propose that lawmakers write policing
practices, reporting mechanisms, and fair wage prescriptions into trade
agreements (p. 188).
By avoiding advocacy for definite policies, Just Trade is not
comprehensive. The general focus on the Americas leaves EU lessons
unexplored. The indigenous rights chapter ignores the experiences of U.S. and
Canadian indigenous peoples. The poverty chapter devotes one sentence to
developing-country institutions. Concrete proposals would have illuminated
practical concerns with integrating human rights and trade law; instead, the
authors focus readers on their paradigm rather than policy minutiae.
The authors commit to only one legal strategy, which raises ultimately
unanswered questions. GATT's default requirement is nondiscriminatory
trade. Article XX provides exemptions for policies protecting public morals,
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human life, and natural resources, among other things. The authors claim that
Article XX's drafters anticipated balancing human rights and trade. However,
trade dispute panels have been "endlessly creative in finding reasons" to
defeat this balance (p. 95). First, earlier GATT panels demanded physically
alike products be treated alike, regardless of production processes or methods
(PPMs). For example, the U.S. -Tuna-Dolphin cases held that tuna is like tuna,
regardless of dolphin-safe fishing techniques. Second, earlier GATT panels
required that Article XX's trade restrictions be necessary or directly related to
human rights ends. This effectively restricted Article XX exemptions to
domestically attainable human rights objectives.
The authors laud recent WTO Appellate Body interpretations of Article
XX, which they style a "swift neutering" of the relationship test and its
domestic objectives constraint (p. 99). They commend the EC-Asbestos
decision, which established a balancing test between a policy's human rights
goals and its less GATT-inconsistent alternatives. The authors also praise the
U.S. -Shrimp-Turtle cases, which permitted the United States to ban shrimp
suppliers that harm sea turtles. These cases validated a PPM distinction, "the
lifeblood of human rights" (p. 90), and "project[ed] the U.S. objective to every
nation that.., wished access to the large U.S. market" (p. 291).
The authors claim that these Appellate Body cases pave the way for
human rights advocates. Article XX's public morals exemption is now an
"especially fertile source of discretion to apply human rights law" (p. 282).
Moreover, multilateral treaties articulating global human rights standards
should increasingly obviate territorial limitations on trade restrictions' aims.
The only limiting factor is that policies must advance "universal or
international moral standards contained in widely accepted human rights
treaties" (p. 149).
This agenda opens the door to unilateral trade restrictions between
asymmetric actors for broad, extraterritorial purposes. A balancing test
between protrade solutions and human rights norms offers the only boundary.
Without anticipating this tradeoff, countries have penned thousands of pages
of human rights treaties. It is not clear exactly which pages trump trade. The
interconnections between rights to a living wage, to a clean environment, and
to health are enormously complex and not always synergistic. At least four
pitfalls should be addressed before trade law is wielded on behalf of such
rights.
First, the authors' agenda may provide cover for protectionism. They
argue that Article XX's chapeau precludes "'disguised restriction[s] on
international trade"' (p. 101). Elsewhere, however, they note that developed
country protectionism currently magnifies global poverty. Disciplining
protectionism is difficult, and the authors would add two further
complications. First, it is unclear which human rights norms would tip a
balancing test toward trade restrictions. Second, the authors attempt no bright
line between disguised restrictions on trade and protectionist policies with
plausible human rights justifications. Countries may shop among newly
validated trade restrictions for protectionist benefits, and the appropriate
outcome is unclear.
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Second, protectionism is not the only problematic motive for trade
restrictions. Political gamesmanship may be one as well. U.S. special interest
groups, for example, will likely solicit U.S. trade law to advance their agendas
abroad. A politician seeking an interest group's support could face a choice:
push controversial extensions of the group's domestic agenda or use its most
domestically accepted values, couched in human rights language, to restrict
trade with a minor partner. If declarations of values drive trade restrictions,
attention to the distant and complex consequences could prove lacking.
The authors' language on environmental and labor issues underscores
this problem. They state, "it is unacceptable that simply because the First
World two centuries ago used resources in an unsustainable manner . . .
developing nations should be permitted" to do the same (p. 112). Developing
states "must accept today's moral standards" (p. 113). Moreover, "workers
simply cannot be asked to support a country's comparative advantage" by
forfeiting rights (p. 169). Yet, many states adopt unpalatable practices, in part,
to combat poverty. Making these countries poorer through trade restrictions
may actually intensify that impulse. If, however, a trade restriction is purely a
statement of values to satiate domestic interest groups, perverse outcomes a
world away seem unlikely to lead to its repeal.
Third, the authors condemn protectionism and unilateral sanctions for
creating poverty, but trade restrictions carry similar risks. Many developing
states export a limited array of products. These states then rely on that revenue
to purchase imports. For a state dependent on a single, wealthy trading
partner, restrictions on its crucial exports mimic unilateral sanctions. For a
state with diversified trading partners, trade restrictions mimic protectionism.
Moreover, sanctions for civil rights violations, at least theoretically, abate
with government policy reversals. Trade restrictions punishing ingrained labor
and environmental conditions may prove difficult for even determined states
to escape.
Finally, trade restrictions based on human rights law may chill both
human rights and trade negotiations. Human rights treaties often contain
aspirational language. States may sign them to express presently unattainable
goals. If every new treaty risks adding "human rights norms" that justify
punitive trade restrictions, parties may avoid the negotiations altogether.
Similarly, if every new trade agreement creates additional dispute resolution
systems that enforce evolving human rights, countries may hesitate to sign on.
The disproportionate bargaining power of developed countries will only
magnify these effects.
Just Trade captures the impact of trade regimes on human rights and
illustrates the unique stakes of WTO jurisprudence. The authors' humanitarian
case for trade restrictions is less convincing. In the future, developing
countries may consistently grow without sacrifices from workers or the
environment. In the interim, using a country's economic vulnerability to
manipulate its development strategy is unfairly heavy-handed. Achieving
sustainable and just growth is a perplexing global challenge and forcing the
dilemma onto the world's poorest countries is unlikely to solve it.
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The Birthright Lottery. By Ayelet Shachar. Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 2009. Pp. 1, 273. Price: $32.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Sara
Aronchick Solow.
In The Birthright Lottery, Ayelet Shachar makes a powerful analogy
between citizenship rights and property rights. Citizenship is a form of
property-holding that confers positive and negative liberties, such as the right
to exclude others and the right to be included in a common enterprise. Shachar
draws from property law to suggest improvements for citizenship law.
Specifically, she urges that we import three fixtures from property law-the
estate tax, Eugino Rignano's principle of declining entitlements, and the
doctrine of adverse possession-into the global citizenship regime. She argues
that these imports will make the set of laws concerning citizenship allocation
more just.
In Part I, Shachar lays out her central proposal: that the world
community apply to the transmission of citizenship a tax similar to the estate
tax. This is the tour de force of Shachar's work. On all persons born citizens
of middle- and high-income countries-the world's children of fortune-
Shachar suggests that there be imposed a "birthright levy." The proceeds of
the levy would go to those unlucky persons who are born citizens of
impoverished countries. Shachar's tax would operate at the state level, with
wealthier states making transfers to less wealthy ones. Although the exact
apparatus for the birthright levy is not specified, the goal would be to establish
a global welfare fund, of sorts, that enables poor persons access to better
nutrition, healthcare, and essential services. Shachar's hope is that, like the
estate tax, the birthright levy will "reduc[e] the presently unacceptable
disparities in life prospects that attach to birthright membership" (p. 101).
In Part II, Shachar advances several proposals that relate, not to
mitigating the harsh effects of citizenship distribution, but to transforming the
way that citizenship is acquired. Here, Shachar suggests two key reforms:
first, that citizenship rights no longer be based solely on "blood and
territory"-facts related to one's birth-but rather on "the social fact of
membership"; and second, that illegal entrants who remain in a country for
long periods of time acquire citizenship if a country "sleeps on its rights" of
removal (pp. 179-180). Shachar's ideas for changing citizenship acquisition
are again borrowed from property law. With respect to her idea that
citizenship be based on jus nexi, or one's "real and effective link" to a
country, rather than on pure jus soli orjus sanguinis rules, Shachar draws on
Eugino Rignano's principle of shifting intergenerational entitlements. The
basic notion is that one's property right should vary with one's closeness to
the property at issue. Grandchildren can be taxed steeply on their inheritance,
because their entitlement to the underlying property is diminished. Third
generation jus sanguinis citizens can be asked to do more to preserve their
status-for instance, meet longer residency requirements-because their claim
to citizenship in the grandparents' country is similarly weak. For her proposal
that illegal entrants be able to acquire citizenship through public actions,
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Shachar borrows from adverse possession doctrine. She equates the illegal
entrant who remains in a country, acts like a citizen, and develops ties to the
adverse possessor who gains rights of property ownership through displaying
public use over time.
The birthright levy, jus nexi principle, and adverse possession regime for
irregular entrants are three novel, compelling, and provocative proposals for
reforming the citizenship regime. All of the ideas stem from Shachar's
powerful insight that citizenship is the most important property right-the
gateway entitlement-that a person holds. Perhaps Shachar's most original
contribution in The Birthright Levy is that she imagines ways to delink
citizenship from the random fact of birth, while being careful to preserve
bounded membership. Unlike many of her contemporaries, Shachar does not
want her reforms of citizenship transmission to undermine the institution of
national citizenship as such.
Nonetheless, each of Shachar's proposals raises a significant question,
either theoretical or practical, about its ultimate feasibility. First, with regards
to the birthright levy, Shachar's policy is normatively questionable because it
seeks to equalize the benefits that attach to citizenship without actually
requiring that wealthy states alter their immigration regimes. On the one hand,
this makes the birthright levy appealing to protectionist governments of the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, as it would
enable such countries to satisfy their moral obligation to foreigners while
keeping admissions constant. The potential pitfall, however, is that Shachar's
remedy is far too weak for the problem she identifies. Shachar bemoans the
unfairness of the birthright regime because citizenship in "developed"
countries confers not just economic opportunities, but also self-realizing
opportunities (pp. 85, 102). Granting her overgeneralization, Shachar rightly
points out that citizenship in "affluent" polities is beneficial because it yields
the right to vote, organize, and participate in a self-governing polity (p. 37).
The birthright levy is a diminished instrument because it reaches only the
material aspects of citizenship. It could help persons in poor countries by
improving their access to water, infrastructure, and nutrition. The levy does
not, however, reach the "enabling" aspects of citizenship; it fails to directly
ensure opportunities for membership in liberal polities. Under Shachar's
regime, individuals born in autocratic countries would unquestionably be
better off in a physical sense. The :.roblem is that they would still be deprived
of some of the most essential privileges that citizenship bestows.
Second, Shachar's proposal that citizenship be based onjus nexi rather
than on birth is problematic not in a theoretical sense, but in a pragmatic one.
Basing the entitlement to citizenship on a totality of factors that evidence
one's "real and effective link" to a country invites deep uncertainty over one's
status. Shachar's goal is noble: she wants citizenship to attach only when a
person's fate is truly intertwined with a given country. In the real world,
however, application of this inherently case-by-case principle calls for a large
amount of discretion by immigration officials. It would be hard to design clear
rules that offer predictability. Has a third generation "citizen" of the United
States living in France reestablished his link to the United States through
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attending a semester study program in an American college? Has a noncitizen
working in the United Kingdom as an illegally non-tax-paying babysitter
passed thejus nexi threshold? In Shachar'sjus nexi regime, individuals would
constantly question the legitimacy of citizenship if the determination varied
with each individual case.
Finally, the proposal to extend citizenship to irregular entrants through
an adverse possession regime also suffers from a significant pragmatic
shortcoming. Namely, it requires irregular entrants to act openly and publicly
in order to attain citizenship, as the adverse possessor behaves with respect to
physical property, despite the fact that this would likely trigger deportation.
Citizenship is not a vacant tract of land that one can make use of without the
involvement of the authorities. Citizenship is an entitlement to be part of a
public enterprise, and the expression of citizenship, at least in its true form,
requires repeated encounters with the state (paying taxes, participation in
school boards, registering a mailing address, receiving public benefits, etc.).
The very reason irregular entrants are able to avoid removal is because they
lead low-profile lives. It is thus unclear how irregular entrants could ever
"earn" their citizenship in the method that Shachar envisions without
hazarding their own deportation.
Professor Shachar has made a strong contribution to the literature on
citizenship and rights; she has suggested ways to make the global distribution
of citizenship fairer while also preserving the institution of bounded
membership and national citizenship. However, the fact that Shachar's
birthright levy only provides the physical comforts of citizenship to
disadvantaged persons and leaves the "enabling" aspects of citizenship aside
suggests that a tax can only go so far. Expanding possibilities for self-
actualizing membership might, at the end of the day, require giving up more
state sovereignty than Shachar desires. Shachar's proposals to delink
citizenship from birth are compelling, but they would be pragmatically hard to
effectuate. Perhaps the widespread use of birth in determining citizenship is
driven by a value that Shachar gives too short thrift: the benefit of
predictability and clarity in an individual's legal status.
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World
War II. By Yuma Totani. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
Pp. 335. Price: $39.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Hugo Leith.
Postconflict justice is evaluated under diverse standards. Abstract
concepts of justice, legitimacy, and accountability all have practical
dimensions: the fairness of procedures, the breadth of jurisdiction, the strength
of the reasoning behind the judgments, and the degree to which interested
groups accept the procedures and outcomes. 2 These factors are complex and
may be in tension, reflecting the multiple interests of states that pursue
international criminal justice. 3 Historian Yuma Totani, in The Tokyo War
2. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 438-40 (2d ed. 2008).
3. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Discipline of International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: SOURCES, SUBJECTS AND CONTENTS 3, 16-17 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008).
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Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II, balances
the ideal vision of justice against the practical opportunities and costs of
international criminal law through a broad account of the Tokyo War Crimes
Trial. Totani draws on under-utilized archives to provide new understandings
of the legal, sociological, and diplomatic implications of the trial. The most
interesting aspect of this valuable work, and Totani's ultimate focus, is an
assessment of contemporary Japanese perceptions-popular and scholarly-of
the Trial. This ends-oriented evaluation necessarily affects the work's critique
of the legal means.
The Tokyo Trial, convened by eleven Allied powers following World
War II, tried twenty-eight high-ranking Japanese officials for war crimes,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The Trial has its
detractors, who offer a number of pointed criticisms: the tribunal was biased;
the accused faced ex post facto justice; the prosecutors ignored the Asian
victims of Japanese crimes; and the tribunal's politically constrained
jurisdiction granted other authors of war crimes impunity.4
Totani gives the Tokyo Trial a qualified endorsement and rejects the
"victors' justice" school. Totani combines empirical evidence with conceptual
findings. The author balances the Trial's irregularities against the
overwhelming weight of historical evidence of Japanese aggression and the
utility of the Trial in demonstrating historical facts to the public.
Consider Totani's analysis of a procedural irregularity of the Trial: the
challenge for bias against Sir William Webb, the presiding judge. The accused
objected to Justice Webb hearing the case due to his extensive wartime work
in investigating Japanese atrocities, an obvious basis for apprehended bias.
The challenge was rejected, provoking fierce criticism by historians and
scholars.5 Totani suggests that the refusal to withdraw by Justice Webb may
have been consistent with international norms, but the more plausible
explanation is that given the preponderance of evidence against the accused,
Justice Webb's position as one of only eleven judges would not prejudice the
outcome. He brought, moreover, considerable qualifications to a tribunal
otherwise short on war crimes expertise (pp. 15-16, 42). From a purely legal
perspective, however, the challenge of alleged bias was apt.
The tribunal's confined personal jurisdiction has also attracted criticism.
Notably, Emperor Hirohito was not indicted. Totani refutes the view that it
was General MacArthur who excused the Emperor from facing trial; rather,
6Allied governments did so (pp. 43-44). As the Tribunal heard evidence it
became clear that Hirohito was a direct and leading participant in, at least,
crimes against the peace; several judges, including Justice Webb, disapproved
of his impunity in separate opinions. In the postwar era, however, the Emperor
was a vital stabilizing influence of benefit to the occupying forces. He carried
as much guilt for aggressive war as those actually convicted and executed, but
4. See, e.g., RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL
(1971).
5. See, e.g., id. at 82-83.
6. See, e.g., Peter Li, Hirohito's War Crimes Responsibility: The Unrepentant Emperor, in
JAPANESE WAR CRIMES 59, 65 (Peter Li ed., 2003).
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the Allied governments felt that trying the Emperor would have been a costly
indulgence.
Totani's interest in the tension between justice and pragmatism
engendered in the Emperor's impunity is focused on its damaging effect on
popular perceptions of the Trial (p. 216), leaving open the question of legal
legitimacy. The work also does not dwell on one of the most difficult
problems caused by the tribunal's confined, and politically controlled,
jurisdiction (p. 252). Possible war crimes committed by the Allies in the aerial
bombing of Japan, including nuclear attacks, were beyond the tribunal's
jurisdiction. Totani rightly suggests that extending postwar justice over the
Allied armies and leaders was an improbable prospect.
Were the accused less guilty of violations against international law
because the presiding judge may have been biased or because others escaped
trial by reason of nationality or political status? The answer must be no; the
historical record speaks for itself. However the question then is whether the
tribunal was a suitable body for judging the guilt of the accused. So, while
Totani is correct that the verdicts returned by the tribunal were ultimately
reasonable and supported by the historical record, domestic and contemporary
international courts follow more stringent legal standards. Totani's approach
necessarily discounts the significance of these matters. This is not to criticize
the work but simply to acknowledge its particular purpose as historical
scholarship.
The work brings into relief the challenge of improving the quality of
justice, while maintaining the broader positive results that postwar justice may
realize-illustrating the significant problems attending such justice being
dispensed ad hoc. Any temporary tribunal faces the critique of ex post facto
justice. At the Tokyo Trial, the accused argued (as did later critics) that the
crime of "waging aggressive war" did not exist at the time of its commission.
Prosecution of this particular crime was the very reason for creating the Tokyo
tribunal as a separate international court, giving the accused the designation
"Class A" war criminals. Totani endorses the conclusion of the majority of the
tribunal, that the existing prohibition on states using aggression provided a
sound basis for holding individuals responsible as criminals for such action,
and cites Japanese legal scholars in support of this proposition (pp. 85-87).
The certainty of the tribunal's majority, and of the prosecutors, stands in
awkward contrast to the protracted postwar efforts to frame a definition of
aggression, most visible today in the unresolved content of the crime in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 7 The criticisms of the
Tokyo Trial, of retrospective justice, official bias, and discriminatory selection
of the accused, would be neutralized before a permanent court, which would
serve the same functions without the accompanying problems.
On the empirical front, Totani pursues two key objectives. First, a
compelling rebuttal of the allegation that the prosecutors at the Trial failed to
pursue charges for atrocities against Asian female civilians8 due to their racial
7. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace and Aggression:
From Its Origins to the ICC, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 207, 214-21.
8. See Yayori Matsui, Women 's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan 's Military
Sexual Slavery: Memory, Identity and Society, in JAPANESE WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, 259, 269.
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biases. Totani refers to the court records in depth: prosecutors presented
charges and evidence proving massive atrocities against Asian civilians,
including mass rape, and the tribunal issued convictions for such crimes (pp.
162, 166-167, 172, 174-175).
The second aspect of the empirical argument addresses the way the trials
were publicized, offering in the process an explanation for the distortion of the
record on key questions, such as the alleged indifference of prosecutors to
crimes against Asian civilians. Totani explains, for example, the frequent use
by the Trial's prosecutor of oral summaries of documentary evidence and the
relatively few witnesses called upon to give verbal testimony (p. 178). This
approach left an observer or journalist completely uninformed and contributed
to lost opportunities for public education.
Totani's ultimate focus is the perception of the Trial in Japanese
academic and legal circles, as a measure of its reception in general society.
This question holds great importance to all postconflict war crimes
investigations. The leading Japanese studies appearing during or shortly after
the Trial regarded the outcomes as fair. The Trial's procedural safeguards,
including the presumption of innocence, the right to mount a defense, and the
right to cross-examine, were also instructive for Japanese courts in the
postwar era (pp. 190-211). Opinion hardened against the Trial only later, after
Japan regained sovereignty and conservative political elements recovered.
Totani links specific aspects of the Trial to developments in public opinion,
emphasizing the shortcomings of procedure that inhibited the public's
capacity to follow the case (pp. 117-118) and the treatment of such
substantive questions as the Emperor's immunity.
In this function of providing public education, the Tokyo Trial is
instructive to contemporary war crimes courts. The Tokyo prosecutors were
fairly selective in presenting charges and evidence, and that has exposed them
to criticism. The alternative, proffering an exhaustive catalogue of charges
(the general practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia), has major drawbacks as well. Lengthy and complex trials place
significant limitations on the restorative effect of international criminal
prosecutions.
9
The flaws in the Tokyo Trial diminish, to an extent, its status as a
legitimate legal institution--even if one rejects the crude hyperbole of the
"victors' justice" label. Yet the flaws need not be replicated. The Tokyo
Trial's irregularities illustrate the reasons for creating impartial institutions
and standards for adjudicating international criminal justice cases. The
problems the tribunal faced are not reasons for dismissing such trials
altogether. Totani's approach offers legal scholars an example of international
criminal justice influencing the attitudes of peoples who have lived through
conflict or under authoritarian rule.
9. RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY 211 (2004).
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Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in
Comparative Constitutional Law. By Mark Tushnet. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009. Pp. xvi, 272. Price: $24.95
(Paperback). Reviewed by Madhav Khosla.
Constitutional theorists debate the justiciability of social welfare rights.
Skeptics suggest that such rights ought to be kept outside the scope of judicial
enforcement for both normative and positive reasons. Adjudicating social
welfare rights, it has been traditionally argued, has serious consequences for
resource allocation and wealth distribution, raising concerns of democratic
legitimacy. Beyond these concerns, courts face problems of capacity. Drawing
on Lon L. Fuller's seminal article,10 many highlight the 'polycentric' nature of
socio-economic rights. In other words, such rights have a complex
relationship with, and impact on, several factors, meaning that judges simply
lack the institutional resources to effectively enforce them. Discussions of
social welfare rights have, for the most part, centered on arguments either
supporting or opposing the justiciability of such rights. Mark Tushnet's Weak
Courts, Strong Rights is a sophisticated contribution to this discussion.
Tushnet alters the orientation of the debate by focusing on the question of
"what sort of enforcement?" (p. 231). Tushnet observes how opponents to
social welfare rights assume that courts will perform strong-form review,
emphasizing that the judicial interpretation will be the final and authoritative
position on the issue. An alternative model that Weak Courts, Strong Rights
puts forth is of weak-form judicial review.
Weak-form judicial review flows from an acknowledgment that there
can be reasonable disagreements about crucial constitutional questions.
Strong-form review necessitates that a reasonable constitutional interpretation
by the judiciary takes precedence over an alternate reasonable interpretation
by the legislature. Weak-form review, on the other hand, "invites repeated
interactions between legislatures and courts over constitutional meaning"
(p. 67). This dialogic form of review reduces concerns of democratic
legitimacy and self-governance that typically arise with strong-form review.
Beyond acknowledging reasonable differences in constitutional interpretation,
one must consider how disagreements ought to be characterized. Moreover,
could there be reasons exogenous to the content of the right for believing that
courts will better enforce them?
Central to Tushnet's argument is the belief that legislators can
meaningfully interpret the constitution (p. 96). Tushnet develops what he
terms a "constitution-based" (p. 79) criterion for evaluating legislative
performance and highlights that the question cannot merely be how well
legislators interpret the constitution; their performance must be judged in
comparison with the performance of courts. Furthermore, in assessing
legislative performance one must remember that there can be, and often is,
reasonable disagreement over the meaning and nature of a constitutional
provision. A responsible legislative position, therefore, will be one that rests
on a reasonable interpretation of the constitution, even though it may be at
10. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978).
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odds with the corresponding judicial position. As Tushnet acknowledges, this
means that the "criterion tilts the field of evaluation in the legislature's
favor-setting a baseline that is truly a line rather than a point-because of
the fairly wide range of reasonable positions available on nearly every
constitutional question" (p. 104). Evaluating legislative performance is a
practice that receives far less attention than it deserves. Tushnet's case studies,
such as his study of the Clinton impeachment controversy, provide interesting
analyses, and Weak Courts, Strong Rights should serve to stimulate discussion
on this issue.
While Tushnet makes a strong case for adopting weak-form review for
social welfare rights, uncertainty about the proper structure of weak-form
review exists. There are a range of possible fashions in which one could
structure rights and remedies. Tushnet explores these possibilities, suggesting
they indicate that "courts should not enforce strong social and economic rights
with weak remedies because those remedies may well become strong ones,
which in turn will lead courts to transform the strong right into weak ones"
(p. 257). While Tushnet's analysis is informative, it serves only to commence
discussion on this issue rather than to end it.
The structuring of rights and remedies, as Tushnet recognizes, is
complex. Some argue for a flexible form of review, one that may be weak-
form in most instances but still acknowledges that the judicial approach must
be strong in others. It is difficult to determine the ideal structure of weak-form
review. The answer could ultimately lie in courts adopting, as some suggest,
weak rights or weak remedies depending on the type of jurisdiction and the
nature of the case. 11 In determining how best to structure weak-form review, it
is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of remedies, an issue that Tushnet
does not sufficiently consider. In some jurisdictions, like South Africa, it is
perhaps too early to judge which remedies in social welfare cases have been
truly effective. In the case of others, such as India, there has simply been little
analysis of this issue. It would thus seem that the tentative conclusions of
Weak Courts, Strong Rights are far from the last word on the balance between
rights and remedies. They may not even be the last word on the ultimate
question of whether weak-form review is feasible in the first place. Tushnet
does concede that "weak-form systems of judicial review might not be stable"
(p. 254). Another question that Tushnet insufficiently considers is whether a
weak-form approach to social welfare rights will result in such an approach
being adopted for first-generation rights. Tushnet's discussion of this concern
is surprisingly brief. Like many important books, Weak Courts, Strong Rights
provides more questions than answers.
Supporters of social welfare rights adjudication have attempted to
demonstrate the polycentric nature of private law with respect to the problem
of institutional capacity. Weak Courts, Strong Rights contributes to this theory
through an analysis of the state action doctrine, demonstrating that social
welfare rights cannot be ignored, for constitutions "must do something about
the constitutional implications of . . . the background rights of property,
11. Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioeconomic Rights: Strong-Form Versus
Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 391 (2007).
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contract, and tort law" (p. xii). Tushnet shows that "the state action question is
analytically identical to the question of identifying constitutionally protected
social and economic rights" (p. 225). Tushnet's study of the enforcement of
the right to free speech demonstrates that resource concerns regarding social
welfare rights are misplaced. The analysis of the state action doctrine and free
speech law illustrates how social welfare rights adjudication is similar not
only to adjudication in many areas of private law, but also in substantive areas
of constitutional law. This contribution should be a step towards resolving the
debate on polycentricity, a concern that has had a remarkable influence on
skeptics of social welfare rights adjudication. Social welfare rights
adjudication does not raise any particularly different concerns from
adjudication in other private and public law areas. Courts in many developing
countries, however, have yet to formulate coherent doctrinal approaches to the
question of resource allocation. This is something to which judiciaries should
pay greater attention.
Distinct from its contributions in the areas of judicial review and social
welfare rights, Weak Courts, Strong Rights' methodological approach is
noteworthy. Tushnet's arguments are consistently informed by the
experiences of a range of countries. For instance, Tushnet demystifies weak-
form judicial review by analyzing the British Human Rights Act (p. 139).
Under the Act, the judiciary can issue a statement that a statute is
incompatible with fundamental rights. While the declaration has no legal
impact, it nonetheless prompts legislatures to react. Tushnet also explores the
possibility of nonjusticiable declaratory rights through a study of the Irish
Constitution, which lists social welfare rights but contains a provision
explicitly barring their enforcement. On social welfare rights in particular,
Tushnet examines decisions of the South African Constitutional Court to
explore how weak-form and strong-form judicial review may work in
practice. This approach illustrates his argument with remarkable clarity,
reminding us of the value of comparative constitutional study.
Greater reference to the experiences of states in Latin America and Asia,
which have adjudicated social welfare rights with some success, would have
been useful and insightful. For instance, a serious examination of the Indian
Supreme Court, which has adjudicated social welfare rights for three decades,
is conspicuously absent.
In the end, Tushnet's most significant contribution is more than merely
making the case for social welfare rights adjudication; he demonstrates the
need to question how courts should best enforce such rights. Advocates of
social welfare rights adjudication must now seriously examine whether the
most appropriate way for society to achieve more is for courts to do less.
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Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments Under International
Law. By Nigel D. White. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. xv,
296. Price: $120.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Daniel Hemel.
In July 2009, Keith Simpson, a member of the House of Commons and
the shadow foreign minister for the U.K.'s Conservative Party, recommended
that his fellow Tories read Nigel D. White's Democracy Goes to War over the
summer recess. 12 It is doubtful that many Members of Parliament (MPs)
followed Simpson's suggestion-Conservative Party leader David Cameron
admitted that he would prefer to start his holiday with a "really trashy
novel" 13-but the few parliamentarians who did peruse the pages of White's
new book would have found that their institution is not portrayed in a
particularly flattering light. "Parliament is simply not independent enough,
nor, it seems, strong enough, to scrutinize the actions of the executive in
matters of such importance as decisions to go to war," White laments (p. 280).
White argues that-especially in matters of national security-the
United Kingdom has come to resemble an "elective dictatorship" (p. 22). The
Prime Minister only consults with an inner circle of advisers before he (or
she) chooses to use force. The Cabinet as a whole has little input on decisions
to deploy troops. Parliament acts as a rubber-stamp. Not only does the Prime
Minister face few domestic constraints on matters of national security, but he
is also unencumbered by international legal constraints. Indeed, White
concludes that the United Kingdom violated international law in the Corfu
Channel incident (1946), the Suez crisis (1956), the Kosovo War (1999), and
the invasion of Iraq (2003), with the legal basis for the 2001 invasion of
Afghanistan shaky at best. White's in-depth analysis of the legal arguments
for and against these troop deployments makes this a useful reference work
for scholars, if not scintillating summer reading for politicians.
White's final chapter sets out a roadmap for constitutional reforms
designed to enhance "democratic accountability" in matters of national
security. First, White argues that the Prime Minister, before deploying troops,
should secure the approval of Parliament. Second, he and his Cabinet should
"clearly state" the international legal basis for any military actions (p. 279).
Third, domestic and international courts should exercise judicial review of
military deployments. But a tone of pessimism pervades these
recommendations; not only does White write off Parliament as weak, but he
adds that "the prospect of developing a more than incidental form of judicial
review of decisions to go to war is remote" (p. 294).
White wants the Prime Minister to be more accountable to domestic
constituencies and to be more faithful to international law. However, efforts to
achieve these two goals may work at cross-purposes with each other. White
argues that courts ought to review the Prime Minister's decisions to deploy
troops abroad, but this would allow unelected judges to overrule a
12. White's book was one of twenty-seven titles on Simpson's summer reading list. See Terry
Stiastny, Beach Reading for Tory Bookworms, BBC NEWS, July 15, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhi/
uk-news/politics/8152669.stm.
13. Michael White, Cameron Starts Holiday with 'Trashy Novel', THE GUARDIAN, July 26,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/juUl26/david-cameron-holiday-trashy-novel.
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democratically elected executive. This may be less problematic when judges
enforce constitutional rules that were previously endorsed by an electoral
supermajority (or, in the U.K. context, when judges enforce an unwritten
constitution to which generations of voters have implicitly assented). But
international law does not instantiate the will of the majority. Treaties are
often made behind closed doors, while customary international law comes to
life through state practice over the course of centuries. Neither involves the
actions of mobilized masses. White acknowledges that "[a]t the moment,
decisions to go to war appear to suffer from a democratic deficit" (p. 73), but
he fails to acknowledge that the democratic deficit might be even wider if
decisions to go to war were removed from elected officials and remanded to
the courts.
White's recommendations regarding Parliament present a different set of
difficulties. In an "elective dictatorship," in which a Prime Minister
unilaterally decides whether to deploy troops abroad, voters express their
approval (or disapproval) for the deployment by casting their ballots for (or
against) the Prime Minister's party in the next general election. Granted, this
accountability mechanism is imperfect; national security will be only one of
many issues at stake in the general election, "[s]o individual decisions to go to
war will not generally be the issue upon which the electorate decides the fate
of the incumbent government" (p. 271). The lines of accountability are even
more tangled when-as White suggests-MPs exercise independent judgment
regarding troop deployments. If each MP simply supports his or her party's
position on national security matters, then parliamentary review of military
deployments is only window-dressing; the Prime Minister, whose party enjoys
a majority in the House of Commons, has little to fear from parliamentary
review. If, however, majority party MPs dissent from the Prime Minister's
position, then voters are presented with a dilemma. Should they express
disapproval for the Prime Minister's position by voting for the dissident MP,
or by voting against the Prime Minister's party? If voters choose the latter
option, then MPs are not held electorally accountable for their positions on
national security. If voters choose the former option, then the Prime Minister's
ability to retain office becomes further removed from voters' views of the
Prime Minister's policies, and he or she becomes less-not more-
accountable to the electorate.
Even if parliamentary review does enhance electoral accountability in
matters of national security, White might not be happy with the results. At the
outset of the 2003 Iraq invasion, survey data showed that 53% of U.K. adults
supported the U.S.-U.K. military action.14 An even larger majority of Britons
supported the Kosovo War in March 1999. 5 U.K. public opinion was more
sharply divided at the outset of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in
14. See Anthony King, The Rank of War Supporters Is Growing, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 21,
2003, at 11.
15. See Joe Murphy, Britons Back the Bombing by 2 to 1, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Mar. 28, 1999, at
1 (finding that 55% of British adults supported the NATO bombing campaign); Britons 'Support Nato
Strikes,' BBC NEWS, Mar. 28, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/306010.stm (reporting results
of one survey showing 56% support for the NATO bombing campaign and another survey showing 69%
support).
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October 1956, but one month after the military campaign began, a plurality
(49%) of Britons said that "we were right to undertake military action in
Egypt," and only 36% disagreed. 16 Importantly, these are all cases in which-
according to White-the legal justification for British military action was
weak. The fact that these military actions enjoyed plurality support suggests
that enhanced democratic accountability on issues of national security will not
necessarily bring the United Kingdom in line with international law.
In sum, White treats accountability and legality as though they were
mutually attainable objectives. His final sentence calls for "greatly increased
levels of democratic and judicial accountability for decisions to go to war"
(p. 296). But "democratic accountability" and "judicial accountability," rather
than being complimentary goals, often conflict with one another. White leaves
us with an unresolved question: what should the United Kingdom (or any
similarly situated democracy) do when popular support for military action is
strong, but the legal basis is shaky? As long as White leaves this question
unresolved, his roadmap for constitutional reform will remain radically
incomplete.
16. See Jean Owen, The Polls and Newspaper Appraisal of the Suez Crisis, 21 PuB. OPINION
Q. 350, 353 (1957).
